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Fun & Profit: When Commercial Parodies
Constitute Copyright or
Trademark Infringement
"[Elverything is funny as long as it is happening to somebody Else, but when it
happens to you, why it seems to lose some of its Humor ......
In copyright or trademark infringement cases, the defendant may argue
that his work is a parody,' and therefore, not an infringement on the
copyright or trademark holder's rights.' In theory, a parody should not
present an infringement problem. It should "conjure up" the original, yet
be distinct, so that it does not infringe on the rights of a copyright or
trademark owner.' In practice, however, parodies can infringe on
another's rights, and the infringement often results from the commercial
nature of the parody.'
1. Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987)
(quoting WILL ROGERS, THE WRITINGS OF WILL ROGERS 75 (1974)). The court noted
that the general public may find a parody of a trademark humorous, but the owner
of the mark will undoubtedly take offense and argue that the parody is an infringe-
ment. Id. The same holds true in copyright cases, where copyright holders seldom
grant permission to use their work in a parody. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437
(9th Cir. 1986) (protecting a parody even where the plaintiff had previously denied
permission to use his song in a parody).
2. Parody is the use of subtle humor to comment on another's work. Note, The
Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use After Betamax, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1395, 1395 (1984) [hereinafter Betamax].
3. See, e.g., Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434 (defendant argued that his song did not
violate the plaintiffs copyright interests because it was a parody); Schieffelin & Co.
v. Jack Co. of Boca, 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1322 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (defendants argued that
their product did not violate the trademark law because it was a parody).
4. Inevitably, there will be conflict between the interests of the copyright or
trademark owner and the expressive interests of the parodist, because "the keystone
of parody is imitation." Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group,
886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that "Spy Notes" was not an infringement
on "Cliffs Notes" because the parody was sufficiently distinct). The court allowed for
some use of the original to-achieve the parody. Id. "It is hard to imagine, for exam-
ple, a successful parody of Time magazine that did not reproduce Time's trademarked
red border." Id.
5. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308-11 (2d Cir.) (finding copyright infringe-
ment where the defendant copied the plaintiffs photograph for "commercial exploita-
tion"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972
While parody may form the basis of a defense to both copyright and
trademark infringement, the analysis of the defense differs.' Under copy-
right law, parody is a form of "fair use," a statutory defense.7 Under
trademark law, parody is only one factor in determining whether a "like-
lihood of confusion" exists.8
Despite the different approaches, both copyright and trademark law
place great emphasis on commercial factors.9 In a fair use analysis under
copyright law, the first of four statutory factors examines the purpose
and character of the use. This factor considers whether the use is for
commercial gain or for nonprofit educational purposes."° Under trade-
F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding copyright infringement when the defendant's
commercial use of a copyrighted song had a negative impact on the economic value
of the original), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding trademark infringement where the
commercial use of a celebrity's persona would present a likelihood of confusion),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Hard Rock Cafe licensing Corp. v. Pacific
Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (finding trademark infringe-
ment where defendant copied the plaintiff's trademark for commercial purposes); DC
Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119 (N.D. Ga.
1984) (finding copyright and trademark infringement where the defendant's characters
"Super Stud" and "Wonder Wench" were in commercial competition with plaintiffs
characters "Superman" and "Wonder Woman").
6. If copyright infringement is alleged, the court will analyze the use under § 107
of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). If trademark infringement is alleged, the
court will ask whether a "likelihood of confusion" exists. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.
v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 909-910 (D. Neb. 1986), affd, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See, e.g., Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co.,
765 F. Supp. 440, 446 (N.D. IM. 1991) (holding that a parody of a television commer-
cial was a fair use).
8. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 648 F. Supp. at 910 (applying the "likelihood of
confusion" test to determine whether a trademark infringement exists).
9. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(declaring every commercial use of copyrighted material presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the copyright holder's interest); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th
Cir. 1986) (stating that the economic factors in a fair use analysis are the most
important); White, 971 F.2d at 1401 (stating that parody is not a defense to trade-
mark infringement where there is a commercial use); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It"
Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894, 899-90 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that the commercial use of
a mark strikingly similar to the plaintiffs mark was an infringement).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The fourth statutory factor also relates to the issue of
commercial use. It considers "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work." Id. In Sony, the Court held that a commercial use of
a copyrighted work was presumptively unfair. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 451.
The fourth factor relates closely to the first factor, because the defendant may rebut
the presumption that a commercial use is an unfair exploitation of the copyright
holder's rights by showing that the parody does not unfairly diminish the economic
value of the original work. Dan Shaked, Application of Copyright Act of 1976 to
Parody, N.Y.L.J.,. June 7, 1991, at 5. See also infra notes 84-88 and accompanying
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mark law, the commercial nature of the parody may be a factor in de-
termining whether a likelihood of confusion exists."
This comment will examine the commercial use of a parody and its
protection under copyright and trademark laws. Part I briefly introduces
the concepts of copyright and trademark law.'2 Part II describes the evo-
lution of parody as a defense."3 Part III discusses the current analysis of
parodies with respect to the commercial use standards the courts ap-
ply." Finally, Part IV proposes the application of a consistent standard
reflecting the underlying policy considerations of the copyright and
trademark laws, respectively."'
I. BASIC CONCEPTS OF COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW
A. Copyright Law
A copyright grants a limited monopoly.'" It grants the copyright holder
text. It is important to note, however, that courts exclude the critical impact of the
parody from the analysis of the economic effect. A court may protect a parody con-
taining social and literary criticism even if it destroys the commercial value of the
original work. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437-38 (protecting a parody that criticized the song
it parodied). The fourth factor only considers whether the parody supplants the
original in the marketplace, i.e., whether direct competition exists. Id. at 438. See
also New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517,
1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a music video entitled "A Nightmare on My Street"
was in direct competition with the film series A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET).
11. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 886 F.2d
490, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1989). The court found a danger of consumer deception because
both the plaintiffs book and the defendant's parody of the book were sold in the
commercial marketplace. Id. at 493. Despite the commercial nature of the parody, the
court held that there was no likelihood of confusion. Id. at 495. But see Nike, 799 F.
Supp. at 897-99 (finding that there was a likelihood of confusion and disregarding the
defendant's claim of parody because of the commercial use).
12. See infra notes 16-46.
13. See infra notes 47-79.
14. See infra notes 80-196.
15. See infra notes 197-241.
16. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT 23 (1971). Public policy disfavors private
economic monopolies, absent overriding considerations. Id. In the case of copyrights,
the overriding consideration is the necessity of granting monopolies to creators to
give incentive for their efforts. Id. Commentators argue, however, the "natural right"
concept that allows for the monopoly over private property provides sufficient justifi-
cation. Id. The artistic creation could be considered "property" in the same manner
as one's tangible property. Id. But see Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180,
the right to (1) reproduce the copyrighted work, (2) prepare derivative
works, 7 (3) distribute by sale, transfer, rental, lease, or lending, (4) per-
form the work in public, and (5) display the work." These rights are ex-
clusive but subject to specific statutory exceptions in the Copyright
Act.'9
Various types of works are protected under copyright law. Protection
extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression," including literary, musical, dramatic, pantomime, choreo-
graphic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, motion picture, audiovisual, and
audio works.' However, the basic criteria for any eligible work to be
copyrighted is that it is "original" and "fixed."2' As new forms of expres-
1193 (1970) (arguing that one should not own a copyright in perpetuity the way one
could own real property in perpetuity, because at some point, the interest in free
expression will outweigh copyright law's goal of encouraging creativity); see generally
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case For Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284-91 (1970) (discussing
the "natural right" theory and the analogy of copyrights to land and chattels).
17. Congress defined a derivative work as
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work con-
sisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The exceptions are set forth in sections 107 through
118 of the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 107-118 (1982). The most significant exception is the fair
use doctrine, found at 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 (1982). See infra notes 25-29 and accompany-
ing text.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Protection does not extend to "any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept,' principle, or discovery . . . ." Id. For
example, if an author is writing a book, the idea of "boy meets girl" is not copyright-
able, but the specific expression of the idea, "Romeo and Juliet" is copyrightable.
21. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1982). A work is original if it was independently created by the author and has
some minimum degree of creativity. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
111 S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991) (holding that a phone book was not copyrightable be-
cause it was merely a compilation of facts and not sufficiently original). The level of
creativity required is extremely low, and novelty is not required. Id. However, facts
are not original and therefore not copyrightable. Id. at 1288.
A work is fixed if
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being trans-
mitted, is 'fixed' . . . if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously
[Vol. 21: 165, 1993] Commercial Parodies
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sion emerge, they may also be protected provided they fulfill the basic
criteria.2
The underlying rationale for copyright protection involves a concern
for both the public welfare and commercial considerations. The Supreme
Court explained that the monopoly over the copyrighted material gives
authors an economic incentive to create works that ultimately will bene-
fit the public.' Although the public will benefit from the creation of
copyrighted works, the copyright laws benefit the creator, and the bene-
fit derived is primarily economic.
The monopoly over the copyrighted material is not absolute. One may
use a copyrighted work without infringing upon the rights of the copy-
right holder if the use falls within an exception such as the fair use doc-
trine.' Fair use includes use for purposes such as "criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching... scholarship, or research ... ."' A court
must determine whether an alleged infringement is protected as a fair
use by considering the four statutory factors listed in section 107 of the
Copyright Act:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
with its transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1982). With technological advances, it was necessary that the statute be broad
enough to include forms of expression not yet invented. Id.
23. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). "The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant ... copyrights is the conviction that encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" Id.
24. Note that two of the four statutory factors in a fair use analysis relate to com-
mercial or economic considerations. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Thus,
when a defendant claims parody as a defense to copyright infringement, pursuant to
the fair use doctrine, it is not surprising that courts are genuinely concerned with the
copyright holder's economic rights.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
26. Id. Parody usually falls within the criticism or comment provision. See Rogers
v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir.) (stating that a parody must comment on the
original to be a fair use), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992). Regardless of the provi-
sion under which parody is considered, Congress clearly intended parody to be pro-
tected as fair use. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (listing activities that could be a fair use and specifically men-
tioning parody).
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."
Congress acknowledged that section 107 defines fair use rather broad-
ly.' The intent was to codify the fair use doctrine while leaving it free
to adapt to new or unusual situations on a case-by-case basis.'
Although copyright law has economic considerations, the primary goal
is to encourage creativity.' This is different from trademark law, where
the primary goal is to facilitate commercial transactions.3
B. Trademark Law
Trademark law is governed by the Lanham Act32 and is based on the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.' A "trademark" is
27. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). A court will balance these four factors, along with any
other factors which it deems appropriate in determining whether the use is fair. Rob-
ert J. Posch, What Is Fair Use; Copyright, 53 DIRECT MARKETING MAG. 61 (1990). For
example, the court may consider whether the work "incidentally parod[ies] other
works while creating a genuinely distinct product" or "comprise[s] little more than an
adaptation of another's original work." DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business,
Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that a parody is not a fair use
where it is merely an adaptation).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982).
29. Id. Congress did not want "to freeze the doctrine,... especially during a
period of rapid technological change." Id.
30. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that copyrights can be granted to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts").
31. NIMMER, supra note 16, at 4 (1971). The Supreme Court has recognized that
there is no kinship between copyright law and trademark law. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982). The Act, also referred to as the 1946 Trademark
Act, was named after Fritz Garland Lanham, a Democratic Congressional representa-
tive. 1 J. THOMAS McCARrHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:4 (1973).
33. The constitutional bases for trademarks and copyrights are quite distinct;
trademark law is based on the Commerce Clause, and copyright law is based on the
Copyright Clause. NIMMER, supra note 16, at 4. Although both copyright law and
trademark law are premised on some form of property rights, the degree of monopo-
ly power granted to the owner differs. A copyright is a true monopoly since it limits
competition with regard to the copyrighted material. See supra note 16 and accompa-
nying text. A trademark is a monopoly over the particular and distinctive mark only.
1 McCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 2:5. Trademarks do not hinder competition; rather,
they facilitate competition in the marketplace by identifying and distinguishing the
competing goods. Id.
The Antitrust laws require competition, not piracy. The essence of competi-
tion is the ability of competing products to obtain public recognition based
on their own individual merit. A product has not won on its own merit if
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defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by oth-
ers."3
A product's trademark will protect both the trademark owner and the
consumer. The owner's goods will be easily recognized, and one who
earns a reputation for quality products will be able to. preserve his repu-
tation through the exclusive use of the trademark.' The consumer will
be able to distinguish among goods in the market and make selections
based on his knowledge of a product's reputation.' The identifying na-
the real reason the public purchases it is that the public believes it is ob-
taining the product of another company. There is not now, nor has there
ever been, a conflict between the antitrust laws and trademark laws ....
Id. See also Standard Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 363 F.2d 945, 954 (5th Cir.
1966) (rejecting the argument that a trademark is a monopoly violative of the antitrust
laws), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). A manufacturer or merchant does not create a trade-
mark merely by selecting a name or mark; a mark must meet a certain level of
distinctiveness or show "secondary meaning" in order to have significance as a trade-
mark. McCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 11:1. A mark will fall into one of the following
categories: (1) arbitrary (a word or symbol that is commonly used in the English
language, but arbitrarily applied to the goods or services at issue; e.g., "Camel" ap-
plied to cigarettes or "Era" applied to laundry detergent), (2) fanciful (a word coined
expressly to be a trademark, or an archaic term not familiar to consumers; e.g.,
"Kodak" or "Pepsi"), (3) descriptive (a word that is descriptive of the purpose or
characteristics of the goods; e.g., "Raisin Bran" applied to a raisin and bran cereal),
(4) suggestive (suggestive marks are not readily definable; they are a middle-ground
between arbitrary and descriptive; e.g., "Coppertone" suntan oil, "Q-Tips" cotton
swabs, "Playboy" magazine, "Sweetarts" candy, or "Wrangler" jeans), or (5) generic
(the generic term for a product, even though the term may have originally been used
as a trademark; e.g., "thermos," "refrigerator," or "aspirin"). Id. If a mark is found to
be arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive, it is given protection immediately upon adoption
and use. Id. at §§ 11:2, 11:20. A mark that is merely descriptive requires secondary
meaning to be protected. Id. at § 11:5. Secondary meaning exists where the words
connote to the public a unique meaning, as opposed to their literal meaning. Id. at
§ 11:9. Generic terms receive no trademark protection. Id. at § 11:1.
It is important to note that a mark does not have to be registered to receive
trademark protection. "An unregistered mark is still entitled to trademark protection
where its use is inherently distinctive as applied to the goods on which it is used, or
where its use has acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace." Nike, Inc. v. "Just
Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894, 896 (N.D. 1l1. 1992). For example, Nike's slogan
"Just Do It" is protected under trademark law because the use of the phrase to
market specific apparel makes it distinctive and arbitrary. Id. at 896-97.
35. McCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 2:2.
36. Id. at § 2:5.
ture of the trademark should prevent confusion for the consumer. 7
The key issue in trademark infringement cases is whether there is a
"likelihood of confusion."' If action by the defendant is likely to cause
confusion among consumers, then he has infringed upon the trademark
owner's rights.' The primary concerns are to protect the consumer
from confusion among products and to protect the trademark owner
from "passing off" and other forms of infringement.
4
0
Although there is no exact standard for determining how similar a
mark must be to establish likelihood of confusion, it is clear that exact
similarity is not required.4 The marks need only be similar enough that
"an appreciable number of reasonable buyers" are likely to be con-
fused.42
Furthermore, it is not necessary to have actual confusion for the plain-
tiff to prevail; the test is whether there is a likelihood of confusion.'
However, a court may consider prior lack of actual confusion as a factor
in finding that there will not be confusion in the future.' Yet, if the
37. Although a trademark should prevent confusion, that is not always the case.
Manufacturers often have problems with "knock-offs," where other manufacturers try
to pass off their goods as those of the established manufacturer. See infra note 41.
38. Id. at § 2:3. The question is whether the consumer is confused as to the
source or sponsorship of the product due to similarity of the marks. Id.
39. Id. at § 2:3.
40. Id. at § 2:4. "Passing off" is the practice where a manufacturer will try to sell
goods by using the established, reputable mark of another manufacturer. Passing off
can damage the trademark owner's reputation, confuse or deceive the buyer, and un-
justly enrich the infringer. Id. at §§ 2:11, 2:12. See Dakota Indus. v. Dakota Sports-
wear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1388 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that there was "passing off
where the defendant used the mark "Dakota Sportswear" with knowledge of plaintiffs
mark "Dakota"). See also Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894, 897
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (explaining that the defendant purposely chose the mark "MIKE"
because he wanted to benefit from the "NIKE" name, and that the marks were indis-
tinguishable from a distance).
41. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1926) (stating that
the Court. will enjoin the use of a mark not only when it is identical to another, but
also when "the resemblance is so close as to be likely to produce confusion"); David
Sherman Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 340 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1965) (holding that the
mark "Sarnoff" vodka was close enough to "SmimoffT vodka to warrant a finding of
trademark infringement).
42. McCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 23:1. It is not clear what an "appreciable"
number is, but it need not be a majority. Id. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 817 (8th Cir.) (holding that confusion among 'only
11% of the millions of potential consumers was sufficiently appreciable), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 905 (1969).
43. MCCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 23:2.
44. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Couri, 220 F. Supp. 929, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding
that there was no likelihood of confusion where rugs marked "Couristan" had been
sold alongside rugs marked "Karastan" and the plaintiff did not have any evidence of
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plaintiff proves actual confusion, he will probably prevail, given that the
purpose of trademark law is to prevent consumer confusion.45 If the de-
fendant has used the plaintiffs trademark in a parody, the likelihood of
confusion among consumers should be diminished.'
II. EVOLUTION OF PARODY AS A DEFENSE
A. What Is Parody?
Parody is when one "for comic effect or social commentary, closely
imitates the style of another... and in so doing creates a new.., work
that makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original.""7 Com-
mentators consider it to be a distinct literary genre' and a socially valu-
able art form. "
A parody is not merely a comment on society; it also comments upon
the original work "conjured up" through imitation.' Otherwise, there
actual confusion); FS Serv., Inc. v. Custom Farm Serv., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 153, 162
(N.D. 111. 1970) (stating that there is a strong presumption against finding a likelihood
of confusion where there is no evidence of actual confusion), affd, 471 F.2d 671 (7th
Cir. 1972).
45. See World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489
(5th Cir. 1971) (stating that there is "no more positive or substantial proof of the
likelihood of confusion" than evidence of actual confusion).
46. See Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987)
(explaining that, because the humorous nature of a parody distinguishes it from the
original, the parody reduces the likelihood of confusion); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that
while a parody by its nature will imitate the original mark, no likelihood of confusion
exists when the parody distinguishes itself).
47. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365
(1992). The court emphasized that in order to receive fair use protection, the parody
must comment on the plaintiffs copyrighted work. Id. at 310. Thus, a parody which
comments only on some aspect of society at large is insufficient. Id. See also Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436 n.8 (6th Cir. 1992) (arguing that
the parody must have commentary value).
48. Betamax, supra note 2, at 1395. Parody is distinguished from travesty and
burlesque. Travesty places noble characters in mundane settings to achieve its humor-
ous effect. Id. at 1395 n.1. Burlesque copies the style of the original, but does not
cover the same subject matter. Id. Parody, however, is considered more difficult and
noble because it ridicules subtle defects in the original itself to achieve its comic ef-
fect. Id.
49. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986). Even if a parody destroys
the original work commercially and artistically, it may warrant protection because of
the important role of parodies in social and literary criticism. Id.
50. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
would be no need to "conjure up" the original.5' Hence,
[a] parody must convey two simultaneous-and contradictory-messages: that it
is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody. To the
extent that it does only the former but not the latter, it is not only a poor parody
but also vulnerable [as an infringement].'
B. Parody In Copyright Law
Vaudeville performers first used parody as a defense at the turn of the
century, when they impersonated other performers by using copyrighted
songs to parody the original performers.' The key issue in those cases
was whether the parody served as a substitute for the actual or potential
commercial use of the original song.' As long as there was no direct
competition between the original work and the parody, the courts did
not want to restrict the socially valuable use of the copyrighted work.'
Parody resurfaced as a defense in the 1950s in response to a new com-
ic medium: television.' The courts changed their focus, however, from a
nied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). In Air Pirates, the parody at issue was a comic book
that portrayed well-known Disney characters as "members of a free thinking, promis-
cuous, drug-ingesting counterculture." Id. at 753 (quoting Kevin W. Wheelwright, Paro-
dy, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. Rev. 564, 571, 582 (1976)).
The comic book parody, therefore, was not only a comment on the relationship
between mainstream society and its counterculture, but also a comment on the
innocent and wholesome nature of the Disney characters themselves. Id. at 758.
51. Id. at 758 n.15. See infra note 111.
52. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 886 F.2d 490,
494 (2d Cir. 1989). "A 'true' parody will be 'so obvious and heavy handed that a
clear distinction [is] preserved in the viewer's mind between the source of the actual
product and the source of the parody.'" Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific
Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (quoting Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Neb. 1986)).
53. Betamax, supra note 2, at 1401. Vaudeville is a light, comical theatrical piece,
which generally includes song and dance. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIc-
TIONARY 2536 (3rd ed. 1986).
54. Betamax, supra note 2, at 1401. See generally Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287, 288
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (holding that where the defendant's purpose is to mimic a per-
former the use of the performer's copyrighted song is not merely incidental to the
impersonation, but is an unnecessary substitute for other methods of expression);
Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977, 979 (C.C.E.D Pa. 1903) (finding that a mimic-
ry of a song is not a substitute for that song).
55. Betamax, supra note 2, at 1401.
56. Id. at 1401-02. The courts may have feared that television would destroy the
motion picture industry. While the courts wanted to encourage creativity, they did not
want to give television performers a license to exploit films. "We realize we are
working in a new field of law, trying to decide particularly what T.V. may take from
motion pictures . . . and what it may not take." Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (protecting a television
parody of a motion picture).
[Vol. 21: 165, 1993] Commercial Parodies
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
determination as to whether there was direct competition to whether an
excessive amount of the original work was used in the imitation.7
The 1976 Copyright Act codified the fair use defense, which incorpo-
rates the common law parody defense.' Section 107 listed four fac-
tors' which reflected judicial concerns raised in earlier decisions.'
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court, in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,"6 refocused the fair use analysis on the
commercial nature of the new work. The Court, placing great weight on
economic considerations, stated that every commercial use of copyright-
ed material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the copyright
holder's interests.' An influential factor in reaching this conclusion was
57. Betamax, supra note 2, at 1402. See Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
131 F. Supp. 165, 183 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (holding that the defendant's parody was not a
fair use because there was a "substantial taking"), affd, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Columbia
Pictures, 137 F. Supp. at 354 (holding that "From Here To Obscurity," a parody of
"From Here To Eternity," was a fair use because there was not a "substantial tak-
ing"). Although courts purportedly decided these cases based on the amount of the
original work used in the parody, there may have been commercial considerations as
well. It has been argued that the courts' goal was to protect the motion picture in-
dustry from any adverse economic effects of the newly developed television industry.
Victor S. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry, and Humorous
Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 233 (1962) (stating that the competition be-
tween motion pictures and television was a factor in Loew's). Oddly, the court in
Loew's seemed to downplay commercial considerations by stating that "[tihe mere
absence of competition ... will not make a use fair .... [Tihe fact that the in-
fringement will not affect the sale or exploitation of the work or pecuniarily damage
[the copyright holder] is immaterial." Loew's, 131 F. Supp. at 184.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
59. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
60. The first factor, which considers whether the use is commercial or non-profit,
reflects the court's concern with commercial use as described in Berlin v. E.C. Publi-
cations, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.) (holding that commercial uses may still
be fair uses), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). The third factor, which considers the
amount of the copyrighted work used, reflects the courts' concerns in Loew's and
Columbia. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. The fourth factor, which
considers the economic effect on the value of the original, reflects the court's con-
cern with competition in the vaudeville cases. See supra notes 53-55 and accompany-
ing text.
61. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
62. Id. at 451. The Second Circuit had previously rejected the contention that use
of a copyrighted work for commercial gain could never be a fair use. Berlin, 329
F.2d at 543-44. The court stated that financial benefits to a copyright holder are
merely incidental to the goals of copyright protection and are not an end in them-
selves. Id. Occasionally, the copyright holder's economic interest must be subordinat-
ed to "the greater public interest in the development of art, science and industry." Id.
that Congress had amended the Code to specifically provide for a consid-
eration of commercial use.' The Court later clarified its definition of
commercial use, explaining that the issue was not whether the parodist
intended to make a profit, but whether he actually would make a prof-
it.' Thus, if a use is for commercial gain, harm to the copyright holder
will be presumed; if the use is for non-commercial purposes, actual or
potential harm must be proven.'
C. Parody In Trademark Law
Parody is a defense to trademark infringement only insofar as the
critical and/or comical nature of the parody lessens the likelihood of
confusion.' Of course, parody is only one factor out of many which de-
termine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.
Furthermore, a defendant's claim that his use is a parody does not
necessarily mean that it actually is a parody.'7 Even if the use can be
defined as a parody, the court may still find a likelihood of confusion,
thus denying protection of the use.'
at 544.
63. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 n.32
(1984). Congress amended the first statutory factor, "the purpose and character of the
use," to include a consideration of whether the use was for commercial use or for
non-profit educational purposes. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
64. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). "The
crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copy-
righted material without paying the customary price." Id. The phrase "without paying
the customary price" refers to the fact that a parodist can arrange to use copyrighted
material through a licensing agreement, under which he pays the copyright holder a
certain amount of money for the use of the material. See HARRY G. HENN, HENN ON
COPYRIGHT LAW § 7 (3d ed. 1991) (explaining the licensing arrangement). If he obtains
a licensing agreement, he cannot be sued for infringement. Id. at 93 n.l. However, if
he violates the agreement, he could be sued for breach of contract. Id. Professional
parodists, such as Weird Al Yankovic, obtain licenses to use the material they parody.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1433 n.3 (6th Cir. 1992) (explain-
ing that the defendant's use of a copyrighted song differed from Weird Al Yankovic's
licensed use of copyrighted songs because the defendants did not obtain a licensing
agreement), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
65. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
66. Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486-87 (10th Cir.
1987) (holding that there is no likelihood of confusion where the defendants parodied
the plaintiffs mark "Jordache" by naming their jeans "Lardashe"). If there is no
likelihood of confusion, then there is no infringement for which the defendant may
be liable. Id. at 1484.
67. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that, despite defendant's claims, the use did not constitute
a parody).
68. See generally Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894, 899 (N.D. Ill.
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In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, some courts
have strictly construed the test to inquire as to the likelihood that con-
sumers would be confused as to the sponsorship or source of the paro-
dy. In Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Manufac-
turing Co.,' the court determined that it was unlikely that consumers
would think plaintiffs sponsored defendant's poster, a depiction of an
obviously pregnant girl wearing a Girl Scout uniform, accompanied by
the slogan "Be Prepared."7'
In cases where the test is strictly construed, the parody usually is not
found to be an infringement. The courts reason that while a successful
parody will necessarily bring to mind the trademark at issue, the parody
will distort some feature of the mark, making it clear that it is a parody
and not the original mark.7
Other courts have used a broader analysis, and they are more likely to
find that a likelihood of confusion exists. For example, in Coca-Cola Co.
v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,' the court found that the defendant's poster par-
ody created a likelihood of confusion' despite the factual similarity
with Girl Scouts.74 The court correctly pointed out, however, that while
1992) (holding that the defendant's mark "MIKE" was so similar to the plaintiff's
mark "NIKE" that there was a likelihood of confusion regardless of any possible
intent to parody); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that the defendant's advertisement created a likelihood of confusion
even though it attempted to parody plaintiff's persona), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443
(1993).
69. 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
70. Id. at 1231. See also Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp.
785, 789-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that there was no likelihood of confusion where
plaintiffs mark "Tetley Tea" was parodied by defendant as "Petley Flea Bags"); Gen-
eral Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F. Supp. 359, 360-61 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (hold-
ing that there was no likelihood of confusion where plaintiffs trademark, "Betty
Crocker," was parodied by defendant's book, "Morey Amsterdam's Betty Cooker's
Crock Book For Drunks").
71. Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First
Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1093 (1986). "Given that the parodist's
version typically differs from the original in ridiculous or grotesque ways, the average
consumer is unlikely to believe that the parody originates with or is sponsored by
the trademark owner." Id.
72. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
73. Id. at 1190.
74. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. In Coca-Cola, the defendant
created a poster that said "Enjoy Cocaine," using the plaintiffs distinctive stylized
script. Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1186-87. Plaintiffs mark says "Enjoy Coca-Cola." Id.
In finding a likelihood of confusion, the court relied upon affidavits stating that con-
the plaintiff in Girl Scouts was not engaged in trade-for-profit, the plain-
tiff in Coca-Cola was so engaged.' Because trademark law is based up-
on the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and is pri-
marily concerned with economic considerations, a plaintiffs commercial
welfare is an appropriate basis for finding a likelihood of confusion."
A parody analysis addresses the concerns of "passing off' and unjust
enrichment.' The courts recognize that a parody is intended to remind
the audience of the original mark, but the result should be comedy, not
confusion.m The common theme among trademark parody cases is the
defendant's contention that regardless of a commercial use, there can be
no likelihood of confusion because a parody, by its nature, clearly distin-
guishes itself from the plaintiffs products.'m
III. CURRENT ANALYSIS OF PARODIES
A. Copyrights: How Commercial Use Affects The Fair Use Analysis
1. Rebutting the Presumption of Unfairness
Since the Sony' decision, the commercial use of a work has been an
important factor in determining whether a parody qualifies as a fair use.
The Sony court stated that "every commercial use of copyrighted materi-
sumers called the Coca-Cola Company to complain about the poster. Id. at 1189 n.9.
Consumers complained about the poster in Girl Scouts, too; but there, the court ob-
served that "indignation is not confusion." Girl Scouts, 304 F. Supp. at 1231.
75. Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1192.
76. Id. Note, however, that although the plaintiffs in Tetley and General Mills were
engaged in trade-for-profit, the courts nevertheless found that there was no likelihood
of confusion. Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785, 789
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); General Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnry Co., 421 F. Supp. 359, 361 (N.D.
Ill. 1976). See supra note 70. The different results in those cases and Coca-Cola are
probably attributable to the courts' interpretation of whether the test for "likelihood
of confusion" should be strict or broad. Shaughnessy, supra note 71, at 1092-95.
77. For further explanation of "passing off," see supra note 40.
78.
In one sense, a parody is an attempt "to derive benefit from the reputation"
of the owner of the mark ... if only because no parody could be made
without the initial mark. The benefit to the one making the parody, however,
arises from the humorous association, not from public confusion as to the
source of the marks.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 322 (4th Cir.) (citing Jordache
Enters. v. Hogg Wyld; Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Sicilia Di R.
Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 431 (5th Cir. 1984))), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 206
(1992).
79. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
80. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, reh'g denied,
465 U.S. 1112 (1984).
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al is presumptively an unfair exploitation" of the copyright holder's inter-
ests." Therefore, courts now require defendants to rebut the presump-
tion of unfair use.' Although the Supreme Court appears to have given
the lower courts a standard by which they can consistently evaluate the
effect of a commercial use, the courts differ on how a defendant can
rebut the presumption of unfairness. The application of different ap-
proaches has led to conflicting results.'
One approach, exemplified by two notable song-parody cases, is to
consider the effect of the parody on the economic value of the origi-
nal.' Essentially, this approach requires the defendant to fulfill the
fourth statutory factor in the fair use analysis (the effect on the econom-
ic value of the original) in order to satisfy the first factor (whether the
use is commercial in nature).' In Fisher v. Dees,' the court stated that
the fourth statutory factor "is undoubtedly the single most important ele-
ment of fair use." 7 Therefore, the defendant can rebut the presumption
81. Id. at 451.
82. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir.
1992) (stating that the commercial use of the work weighed against a finding of fair
use because the defendant did not meet the burden to rebut the presumption of
unfairness), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
83. See infra notes 84, 96, 97, 99 and 112 and accompanying text. Compare Tin
Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
that a television commercial that parodied a rap group was not a fair use where it
was used for commercial gain) with Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765
F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. IlM. 1991) (finding that a television commercial that parodied
another television commercial was a fair use despite the commercial use); compare
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the song "When
Sonny Sniffs Glue," a parody of "When Sunny Gets Blue," was a fair use) with MCA,
Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the song "Cunnilingus
Champion of Company C," a parody of "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy," was not a fair
use).
84. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438 (finding a parody to be a fair use where there is
no competition between parody and original); Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1438-39
(6th Cir.) (finding a parody to not be a fair use where there is an economic impact
on the market for derivative works.), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
See also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding a parody to
not be a fair use where there was competition between the songs); DC Comics, Inc.
v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. '110, 116 (N.D. Ga 1984) (finding a
parody to not be a fair use where both the plaintiff and defendant were involved in
entertainment).
85. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
86. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
87. Id. at 437 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 566 (1985)). See also New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F.
that his use is unfair by showing that the parody does not fulfill the de-
mand for the original." In Fisher, the defendant, Rick Dees, wrote a
song called "When Sonny Sniffs Glue," which parodied the plaintiffs song
"When Sunny Gets Blue."' The court affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the defendant, holding that because the two
works did not compete with one another, the parody deserved fair use
protection despite its commercial use.'
However, a court will deny protection to a parody if it finds the eco-
nomic effect on the original to be negative. In Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v.
Campbell,' the rap group 2 Live Crew released a song called "Oh, Pretty
Supp. 1517, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that the most important fair use factor is
the effect on the economic value of the original).
88. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438. See also New Line Cinema Corp., 693 F. Supp. at
1525 (stating that the functional differences between a serious work and a parody of
it would prevent the parody from fulfilling the demand for the original).
89. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434. Dees had requested permission to use the plaintiffs
music, but Fisher refused. Id. Fisher filed suit for copyright infringement when Dees'
song, which was an "obvious take-off" of the original, was released. Id. The fact that
Dees published the parody despite Fisher's denial of permission does not render
Dees' use unfair. Parodists are rarely able to get permission to use the original work
because authors do not want their songs to be parodied. Id. at 437.
90. Id. at 434, 438. The court stated:
This is not a case in which commercial substitution is likely. "When Sunny
Gets Blue" is "a lyrical song concerning or relating to a woman's feelings
about lost love and her chance for ... happiness again." By contrast, the
parody is a 29-second recording concerning a woman who sniffs glue, which
"ends with noise and laughter mixed into the song." We do not believe that
consumers desirous of hearing a romantic and nostalgic ballad such as the
composers' song would be satisfied to purchase the parody instead..
Id. at 438 (citations omitted). The court's concern with direct competition is reminis-
cent of the courts' concerns in the vaudeville cases. See supra notes 53-55 and accom-
panying text.
See also Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d
Cir. 1980) (holding that Saturday Night Live's parody of "I Love New York" entitled "I
Love Sodom" was a fair use where it did not fulfill the demand for the original). But
see MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). In MCA, the defendant's song,
"Cunnilingus Champion of Company C," parodied the plaintiffs song, "Boogie Woogie
Bugle Boy." Id. at 182. The court held that the parody was not a fair use because
there was competition between the songs. Id. at 185. The court reasoned that both
songs were used for entertainment, both songs were made into sound recordings, and
both songs used the same tune. Id. The same factors were present in the Fisher case,
yet the court there held that there was no competition between the songs. Fisher 794
F.2d at 438. The MCA court denounced the appropriation of the plaintiffs song for a
commercial use, stating, "We are not prepared to hold that a composer can plagiarize
a competitor's copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for com-
mercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a parody .... . MCA,
677 F.2d at 185.
91. 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in part, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
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Woman," meant to parody the song "Oh, Pretty Woman," originally writ-
ten and recorded by Roy Orbison 2 The defendants argued that
Orbison's version of the song was "white-centered" popular music, but, in
contrast, the 2 Live Crew version was a protest, written in the form of a
parody, which "[made] fun of the 'white-bread' originals and the estab-
lishment."' The court followed the Fisher test and asked whether the
parody "unfairly diminish[ed] the economic value of the original."' The
court concluded that the 2 Live Crew version was an infringement be-
cause the economic value of the original was diminished, not as a result
of direct competition between the two songs, but as a result of harm to
the market for derivative works. 5
A second approach has been to consider whether the defendant will
profit financially from the parody.' Some courts hold that financial
profit automatically bars fair use protection." Courts applying this stan-
92. Id. at 1432. Acuff-Rose Music had denied permission to use the song "Oh,
Pretty Woman" in a parody. Id.
93. Id. at 1433. It is unlikely that the two versions of the song would compete in
the marketplace. The defendant's expert claimed that the rap version by 2 Live Crew
is musically antithetical to the lyrical version by Orbison. Id.
94. Id. at 1437 (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 974 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986)). See also
DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118 (N.D. Ga.
1984) (finding infringement where the defendants conducted a similar business, satis-
fied a demand for the original, and created competition for the plaintiff).
95. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1439. The court analogized 2 Live Crew's use of the
song to a movie adaptation of a book: even though the movie may help-boost book
sales, the use negatively affects the book's economic value because the copyright
holder has difficulty selling his adaptation rights. Id. (citing Rogers v. Koons, 960
F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992)). See also New Line Cine-
ma Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (hold-
ing that the music video for the song "Nightmare On My Street" would harm the
market for derivative works of the movie A NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET).
In labeling the 2 Live Crew version of the song a "derivative work," the court
reasoned that the song was not distinct enough to be a work in itself. Perhaps the
result can be explained by the court's unwillingness to find the 2 Live Crew version
to have significant commentary value. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436 n.8. The court re-
peatedly referred to Rogers v. Koons, where the court denied fair use protection to a
work that merely parodied society at large rather than some aspect of the copyright-
ed work. Id.; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. Comment or criticism on the copyrighted work
is essential to the fair use doctrine. Id. at 310; see infra note 116. To receive protec-
tion, a defendant must "engage in critical comment that constitutes part of the 'free
flow of ideas' underlying the doctrine of fair use." DC Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 118.
96. Shaked, supra note 10 at 7 (explaining the courts' approaches to parodies of
copyrighted works).
97. See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y.
dard are unlikely to find any parody to be a fair use because most paro-
dies are sold for profit.' Other courts hold that if the defendant will
profit financially, there must be an expressive purpose to the use in or-
der to receive fair use protection."
In Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,'" the court held that
Miller's television commercial that parodied the rap group, the Fat Boys,
was not protected as a fair use because the commercial was used solely
for profit.'"' The court reasoned that the commercial nature of the paro-
dy precluded it from offering the necessary commentary."'2
In contrast, the court in Eveready Battery Co., v. Adolph Coors Co."
protected a Coors television commercial that parodied an Eveready tele-
vision commercial.' The Coors commercial featured actor Leslie Niel-
sen dressed as a giant bunny, parodying the well-established "Energizer
Bunny" commercials." Eveready, relying on the decision in Tin Pan
1990) (holding that a parody was not fair use because it was used solely for profit);
DC Comics v. Crazy Eddie, 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that a
parody was not a fair use because it was used for profit).
98. Shaked, supra note 10, at 7 (arguing that commercial parodies should be
afforded protection as a fair use, otherwise a long cherished form of entertainment
will be endangered).
99. See, e.g., Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 446-48
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that a parody was a fair use, despite being used for profit,
because the parody had some expressive value).
100. 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
101. Id. at 832. The court found that the commercial was made solely for profit
and did not qualify as a parody. Id. The court tied these two findings together, stat-
ing that "defendants' commercial does not qualify as a parody. The commercial's use
is entirely for profit: to sell beer." Id.
102. Id. at 832. See also DC Comics v. Crazy Eddie, 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (concluding that it is not necessary to analyze the four fair use
factors because the commercial did not qualify as a parody due to the exploitation of
the copyrighted work for personal profit).
103. 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
104. Id. at 452.
105. Id. at 442-43. The "Energizer Bunny" is a pink toy bunny, wearing sunglasses
and beach thongs, that moves across the television screen, beating on a drum im-
printed with the Energizer logo. Id. The format is a "commercial within a commer-
cial." Id. at 442.
Each spot begins with what at first appears to be a typical television adver-
tisement (which the viewer later realizes is for a fictitious product or ser-
vice). At some point . . . the Energizer Bunny ... strolls onto screen
beating his bass drum. The actors of the bogus commercial stare incredulous-
ly as the intruding mechanical toy bunny nonchalantly propels across the
screen, beating the drum and often knocking over props from the fictitious
commercial's set .... Each of the commercials ends with a voice-over
which states: "Still going. Nothing outlasts the Energizer. They keep going
and going . .. ."
Id. The Coors commercial begins as a generic advertisement for a beer. Mr. Nielsen
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Apple,"° argued that "the promotion for sale of commercial products
cannot constitute parody as a matter of law," and, therefore, the com-
mercial could not be a fair use."7 The court rejected Eveready's argu-
ment and criticized the Tin Pan Apple decision, stating that it is "directly
contrary to § 107 of the Copyright Act.""° Under section 107, a court
may consider whether the use is commercial, but it is only one factor
among many in determining whether a use is fair.' By allowing the
court to weigh several factors, the Act recognizes that parody may be
simultaneously commercial and expressive.'
Finally, in determining fair use, courts have also examined the intent
of the defendant. In Rogers v. Koons,"' the court found that "knowing
exploitation" of a copyrighted work is a factor which "militates against
finding a fair use.""2 In Koons, the defendant purchased a notecard de-
piction of the plaintiffs photograph "Puppies," removed the back portion
indicating the plaintiffs copyright, and sent it to his artisans with instruc-
tions to copy the photograph."3 The defendant argued that the resulting
then appears, wearing a business suit, fake white rabbit ears, a white tail, and pink
rabbit feet. He beats a bass drum with the Coors Light logo on it. The commercial
ends with a voice-over which says, "Coors Light, the official beer of the nineties, is the
fastest growing light beer in America. It keeps growing and growing and grow-
ing . . . ." Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 443.
106. Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
107. Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 446.
108. Id. § 107 of the Copyright Act defines the fair use doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982). See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
109. Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 446.
110. "Although the primary purpose of most television commercials (like other
works of a 'commercial nature') may be to increase product sales and thereby in-
crease income, it is not readily apparent that they are therefore devoid of any artistic
merit or entertainment value." Eveready, 765 F. Supp. at 446-47.
111. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
112. Id. at 309 (emphasis added). See also Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc.
v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that the court
will consider whether the work was used for "commercial exploitation" in determin-
ing whether there was a fair use); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music
Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting a preliminary injunction
where defendant's improper motive would support a finding of infringement in
pending litigation).
113. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305. The notecard was made from a photograph which
Rogers had taken of a couple holding eight newborn German Shepherd puppies. Id.
at 304. Koons found the picture to be "typical, commonplace and familiar" and want-
ed to include it in his "Banality Show." Id. at 304-05. Koons directed his artisans to
make a three-dimensional sculpture of the image. Id. at 305. Koons instructed his
artisans: "work must be just like photo - - features of photo must be captured." Id.
sculpture entitled "String of Puppies" was a "parody of society at large"
and deserved fair use protection."4 The court denied that Koons' use
was fair, reasoning that the sculpture was made in bad faith and primar-
ily for profit-making motives."5
Thus, the outcome of a case will depend on both the court's interpre-
tation of "commercial use" and the court's approach to rebutting the pre-
sumption of unfairness."6
2. The Scope of the Presumption of Unfairness
Another inconsistency resulting from the Sony decision is the courts'
interpretation of the presumption of unfairness. The courts in Koons and
Eveready noted that a determination of fair use still depends upon the
totality of the four factors."7 Thus, even if a parody had a commercial
use, the parody could still be protected as a fair use."8 In Tin Pan Ap-
ple, however, the court construed the Sony presumption to preclude a
finding of fair use where the use was deemed commercial in nature."9
114. Id. at 309.
115. Id. at 311. The court also held that Koons' sculpture did not qualify as a paro-
dy. Id. To justify use of the original work, a parody must not only be a social com-
mentary, but it must also comment upon the original expression. "Otherwise, there
would be no need to conjure up the original work." Id. at 310. (citations omitted).
On this point, the court stated:
We think this is a necessary rule, as were it otherwise there would be no
real limitation on the copier's use of another's copyrighted work to make a
statement on some aspect of society at large. If an infringement of copyright-
able expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the
infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use-without insuring public
awareness of the original work-there would be no practicable boundary to
the fair use defense .... The rule's function is to ensure [sic] that credit is
given where credit is due.
Id. at 310. The court found that because there was no way to discern that the sculp-
ture was a parody of the photograph, it did not constitute a parody of the original
work. Id. However, even though a work does not qualify as a parody, it may still be a
"fair use" under the factors set forth in § 107. See supra notes 27-29 and accompany-
ing text. Nevertheless, in Koons, the defendant's improper motives precluded a finding
of fair use. Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
116. See supra notes 80-116 and accompanying text.
117. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308; Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F.
Supp. 440, 446 (N.D. 111. 1991). "We have stated that, though it is a significant factor,
whether the profit element of the fair use depends on the totality of the factors
considered; it is not itself controlling." Koons, 960 F.2d at 309. The four factors relate
to purpose of use, type of work, amount used, and subsequent effect on market
value. Id.
118. Id.
119. Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). See also D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1177, 1178
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The remaining question is whether the presumption serves as a threshold
which, if not met, precludes a finding of fair use, or whether the pre-
sumption should be considered in light of the other statutory factors.
The language of the Sony decision suggests that the Court did not in-
tend to exclude commercial uses entirely from fair use protection." Al-
though the court wanted to protect copyrighted material from commer-
cial exploitation, the Court chose to apply only a rebuttable presumption
rather than a conclusive presumption.2' The Court noted Congress' in-
tent in adding the consideration of commercial use to § 107:
This amendment is not intended to be interpreted as any sort of not-for-profit lim-
itation on educational uses of copyrighted works. It is an express recognition that,
as under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character of an activity,
while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be weighed along
with other factors in fair use decisions.'"
Thus, the presumption should be treated as only one factor in the analy-
sis, as the courts did in Koons and Eveready.iu
B. Trademarks: How A Commercial Use Can Cause Confusion
Courts have not applied a consistent standard to determine whether a
parody is protected under trademark law. The commercial use of a paro-
dy is clearly an important factor because trademark law is premised
upon commercial protection."4 However, courts have adopted different
approaches when determining how commercial use affects the likelihood
of confusion analysis."
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that the defendant's commercial was not a fair use because
it was an "unjustifiable appropriation of copyrighted material for personal profit").
120. See Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-51
(1984) (discussing the role of the commercial/non-profit distinction in a fair use
analysis).
121. The Court stated that "[a]lthough not conclusive, the first factor requires that
'the commercial or nonprofit character of the activity' be weighed in any fair use
decision. If. . . [the defendant's use was] for a commercial or profit-making purpose,
such use would presumptively be unfair." Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). In determining that the first factor was not dispositive, the Court probably
meant that if the defendant's use was commercial or for profit, that factor would
automatically weigh against the defendant. The use could still be a fair use if the
other factors were favorable. See id.
122. Id. at 450 n.32 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679).
123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
125. Some courts deny protection to a parody if there is any commercial purpose.
Some courts have held that a parody used for commercial purposes
will not be protected."u In White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc.,27 the court overturned the lower court's protection of the
defendant's advertisement parodying Vanna White, a celebrity on "Wheel
of Fortune."" Samsung argued that their parody should be protected,
citing Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell" and L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc.,"° where courts protected humorous and fake adver-
tisements in magazines which parodied Jerry Falwell 3 ' and L.L.
Bean,"2 respectively."n The White court remanded the case, noting
that Samsung's parody may not be protected because of its commercial
use." The court stated:
See infra note 126. Some courts focus on the defendant's underlying intention in
making the commercial parody to determine whether there was an infringement. See
infra note 142. Other courts use a First Amendment analysis. See infra note 160.
Finally, some courts look at the practical effects in the marketplace to determine
whether there is a likelihood of confusion. See infra note 178.
126. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a parody may not be protected when used for commercial purposes),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp.
894, 898 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding that a parody was not protected where it was used
for commercial purposes); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (stating that a parody is not protected
where there was commercial misappropriation); Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F.
Supp. 1166, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 1986), affd, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding infringe-
ment where the defendant's parody was used commercially).
127. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
128. Id. at 1396. The advertisement in question "depicted a robot, dressed in a wig,
gown, and jewelry which [was] consciously selected to resemble White's hair and
dress. The robot was posed next to a game board which is instantly recognizable as
the Wheel of Fortune game show set, in a stance for which White is famous." Id.
129. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
130. 811 F.2d 26 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
131. Jerry Falwell is a "nationally known minister who has been active as a com-
mentator on politics and public affairs." FalweU, 485 U.S. at 47. The parody at issue
was a fake advertisement for Campari Liqueur, whose advertising campaign featured
interviews with various celebrities about their "first time." Id. at 48. The adver-
tisements played upon the sexual connotation of "first time," even though the inter-
views were about the first time the celebrity tasted Campari. Id. The parody followed
the Campari format and consisted of an "interview" with Falwell "in which he states
that his 'irst time' was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in
an outhouse." Id. At the bottom of the page, there is a disclaimer. "[A]d parody - not
to be taken seriously." Id. The court held that the parody was protected speech
under the First Amendment. Id. at 57.
132. L.L. Bean is a manufacturer of clothing and specialty products. They market
their goods primarily through mail-order catalogs.
133. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).
134. Id. The court, in dicta, expressed concerns that a consumer might conclude
that White endorsed the product. Id. The court noted that the facts of this case tend
to support a finding of likelihood of confusion:
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This case involves a true advertisement run for the purpose of selling Samsung
VCRs. The ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient and
only tangentially related to the ad's primary message: "buy Samsung VCRs."
Defendants' parody arguments are better addressed to non-commercial parodies.
The difference between a "parody" and a "knock-off" is the difference between
fun and profit'
Furthermore, in Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enterprises,'" the court held
that parody is not a defense to trademark infringement where the defen-
dant relies on the popularity of a well-established mark for the
defendant's commercial gain."' Thus, where the defendant created a
line of clothing with the mark "MIKE," which parodied the plaintiffs
mark "NIKE," the court found trademark infringement."l
Some courts, however, protect commercial parodies."n Each jurisdic-
tion applies its own criteria for determining whether commercial paro-
dies create a likelihood of consumer confusion or are entitled to protec-
tion. '4 However, three factors have proven more influential or disposi-
tive in the courts' analysis: intent of the defendant, First Amendment
considerations, and practical results in the marketplace.'
4
In cases concerning confusion over celebrity endorsement, the plaintiffs
"goods" concern the . . . source of the plaintiffs fame. Because White's fame
is based on her televised performances, her "goods" are closely related to
Samsung's VCRs. Indeed, the ad itself reinforced the relationship by informing
its readers that they would be taping the "longest-running game show" on
Samsung's VCRs well into the future.
Id. at 1400.
135. Id. at 1401.
136. 799 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
137. Id. at 898. See also Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding that "[plarody is no defense to
[defendant's] misappropriation of the famous HARD ROCK CAFE logo").
138. Nike, 799 F. Supp. at 899.
139. See infra notes 137, 148, 160, 167, and 173.
140. For example, the Fourth Circuit considers: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs
mark, (2) the similarity between the marks, (3) the similarity of the products they
identify, (4) the similarity of business facilities, (5) the similarity in advertising, (6)
the defendant's intent, and (7) whether there is evidence of actual confusion.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 206 (1992). The Ninth Circuit considers similar factors, but also looks at
the likely degree of purchaser care and the likelihood of expansion of product lines.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing AMF,
Inc. v. Sleekcrate Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)).
141. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining how trademark parodies can be protected
under the First Amendment); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d
A commercial parody may be protected if the defendant had a proper
intent. 42 In Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., the defendant
created and marketed a line of designer jeans for large women under the
name "Lardashe."" The plaintiff, who marketed a line of designer jeans
under the name "Jordache," filed a suit for trademark infringement.4 '
The district court found that the defendant's "intent was to employ a
name that, to some extent, parodied or played upon the established
trademark Jordache," but they "did not intend to 'palm off their jeans as
Jordache jeans; that is, to confuse the public into believing it was buying
a Jordache product."4 ' The circuit court acknowledged the general pre-
1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that the intent of the defendant to parody the
plaintiffs mark was an important factor in .determining whether there was likelihood
of confusion); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978),
(holding that the court must analyze the practical effects in the marketplace to
determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1979).
142. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 962 F.2d at 321 (holding that the parody was pro-
tected because the defendant did not intend to confuse the public); Jordache Enters.,
Inc., 828 F.2d at 1485 (holding that there was no likelihood of'confusion where the
defendant intended to parody the plaintiffs mark, and did not intend to confuse the
public); Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 759 (finding that the likelihood of confusion
was diminished where there was no improper intent by the defendants). However, if
the parodist has improper motives, the parody will not be protected. See Nike, Inc. v.
"Just Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894, 897, 899 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding likelihood of
confusion where the defendant intended to benefit from the plaintiffs mark); Grey v.
Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1173-75 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (finding likelihood of
confusion where the defendant chose a mark similar to the plaintiffs in order to
capitalize on the plaintiffs reputation), offd, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987).
143. 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 1483-84. Other names considered for the jeans include: "Seambusters,"
"Rino Asirus," "Vidal Sowsoon," "Calvin Swine," "Wiseashe," "Dumbashe," and
"Horsesashe." Id. at 1483.
145. Id. at 1483-84. They also alleged violation of New Mexico's anti-dilution statute.
Id. Anti-dilution statutes are state laws that may provide relief to trademark owners
even when there is no likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1488. Dilution occurs when
there is one of the following: (1) diminished value to a mark, due to actual or po-
tential confusion; (2) "diminution in the uniqueness or individuality of a mark;" or (3)
damage to a mark, resulting from a use that tarnishes its image or appropriates its
goodwill and reputation. Id. at 1489. If the state has an anti-dilution statute, dilution
may be plead in conjunction with trademark infringement.
146. Id. at 1485. If Hogg Wyld had intended to "pass off" its goods as Jordache
products, there would have been trademark infringement. See supra note 40. The
"deliberate adoption of a similar mark may lead to an inference of intent to pass off
goods as those of another which in turn supports a finding of likelihood of confu-
sion." Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 927 (10th Cir. 1986)
(finding that the defendant chose the mark "Brew Nuts" in order to exploit the
popularity of "Beer Nuts").
Furthermore, in Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894, 897 (N.D.
IMI. 1992), there was evidence that the defendant intended to pass off his products as
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sumption that choosing a mark similar to a well-established mark indi-
cates an intent to confuse the public,'47 but affirmed the district court's
decision, stating that "where a party chooses a mark as a parody of an
existing mark, the intent is not necessarily to confuse the public but
rather to amuse.""4 In this case, the benefit of the parody was derived
from its humorous association, not from public confusion with respect to
the source of the product."9 Although the marks were similar, it was
the difference between them that produced the desired effect." Finding
no likelihood of confusion, the court held that the defendants had not in-
fringed on Jordache's trademark. 5' The court concluded that "[ajn in-
tent to parody is not an intent to confuse the public."52
that of Nike. The defendant admitted that he knew of Nike's trademark rights and
that he wanted to benefit from Nike's advertising and promotion. Id. The court held
that the defendant's conduct resulted in a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 899. See also
Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1173-75 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (reasoning
that there is likelihood of confusion where defendant Grey marketed DOGIVA dog
biscuits, intending to benefit from the GODIVA name).
147. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1486. For example, in Beer Nuts, the defendant marketed
peanuts under the name "BREW NUTS," which was found to infringe on the
plaintiffs trademark for "BEER NUTS." Beer Nuts, 805 F.2d at 928. The court rea-
soned that where the marks are similar and where the defendant had knowledge of
the plaintiff's popular mark, there is an inference of intent to pass off the product as
that of the plaintiff. Id. at 927.
148. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1486. The court's decision in Jordache may help to
explain why the law protects some uses and not others. In Jordache, the court found
the alleged infringement to be humorous and was inclined to protect the use as a
parody. Id. In Beer Nuts, however, the defendant did not select his mark for its hu-
morous effect but rather because of its similarity to the plaintiffs mark. Beer Nuts,
805 F.2d at 927. When it is clear that a use is a parody, the court is more likely to
protect it because the humorous nature of the use, though commercial, will prevent
confusion. See Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1486.
149. Id.
150. Id. Jordache can be distinguished from Beer Nuts. In Beer Nuts, the defendant
relied on the similarities between the marks to achieve his goal. Beer Nuts, 805 F.2d
at 927. In Jordache, the defendant relied on the differences. Jordache, 828 F.2d at
1486.
151. Id. at 1488. See also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th
Cir. 1978) (absence of improper intent by the defendants diminished the likelihood of
confusion).
152. Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1486. The court recognized that a parody of an existing
trademark could cause a likelihood of confusion, especially if the marks were confus-
ingly similar or if there was evidence of actual confusion. Id. However, the court
found that if there was no likelihood of confusion, the parody should be protected.
"No one likes to be the butt of a joke, not even a trademark. But the requirement of
trademark law is that a likely confusion of source, sponsorship or affiliation must be
The role of the defendant's intent was flushed out further in Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc."' The defendant sold souvenir T-shirts
that displayed a design similar to the plaintiffs Budweiser beer trade-
mark."M Anheuser-Busch argued that the parody should not be protect-
ed because the defendant's intent was to make money by exploiting the
"commercial magnetism" of the Budweiser label."M The court of ap-
peals, however, strictly construed the test for trademark infringement,
limiting the inquiry to whether there was a "likelihood of confusion. " "
While acknowledging that profit primarily motivated the defendant, the
court stated that "the relevant intent in trademark cases is not merely an
intent to profit, which would condemn all commercial parody, but an
'intent to confuse the buying public." 57 The court reinstated a jury's
verdict that the defendant's T-shirt presented no likelihood of confusion,
proven, which is not the same thing as a 'right' not to be made fun of." Id. (quoting
2 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:38 (2d ed. 1984)).
153. 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1992).
154. Id. at 317. The T-shirts' visual design and color contained similarities to the
Budweiser beer label, but achieved the parody through the words on the shirt. The
T-shirt did not mention "Anheuser-Busch" or "Budweiser." Instead, it substituted the
words "Myrtle Beach" and "Myrtle Beach, S.C." Id. at 318. Where the Budweiser label
said
This is the famous Budweiser beer. We know of no brand produced by any
other brewer which costs so much to brew and age. Our exclusive
Beechwood Aging produces a taste, a smoothness, and a drinkability you will
find in no other beer at any price,
the T-shirt said
[Tihis is the famous beach of Myrtle Beach, S.C. We know of no other resort
in any state which lays claim to such a rich history. The unspoiled beaches,
natural beauty, and southern hospitality compose a mixture you will find in
no other beach in any state.
Id. at 319. The T-shirt replaced "This Bud's for you" with "This Beach is for you." It
replaced "Brewed by our original process from the Choicest Hops, Rice and Best Bar-
ley Malt" with "Myrtle Beach contains the Choicest Surf, Sun, and Sand." Id.
155. Id. at 321. Anheuser-Busch also argued that the T-shirt design did not qualify
as a parody because the "purpose was to make money and not to make any com-
mentary about Budweiser beer." Id. The court, however, determined that the design
was a parody because it provided "a simple form of entertainment conveyed by
juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the trademark with the idealized image
created by the mark's owner." Id. (quoting L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,
811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987)). It is interesting to note
how this position differs from copyright law, where commentary on the original is
required to qualify as a parody protected under the fair use doctrine. See supra notes
96 and 116.
156. Anheuser-Busch, 962 F.2d at 321-22.
157. Id. at 321 (quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1535 (4th Cir.
1984)). The court noted that, ordinarily, the intent to profit from an established mark
is equivalent to the intent to confuse the public but held that the ordinary maxim
does not apply in parody cases. Id. at 322.
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reasoning that the commercial success of the T-shirts could have resulted
from consumers' amusement at the cleverness of the design, and not
from confusion with respect to the source or sponsor of the shirt.'" Ac-
cording to the court, the purpose of the Lanham Act is "to protect con-
sumers from product misinformation, not to deprive the commercial
world of all humor and levity."6 9
A number of defendants have sought protection for their parodies
under the free speech doctrine of the First Amendment, with varying
results."6 It is well settled that commercial speech is afforded less First
Amendment protection than expressive speech.'' The difficulty arises
when the nature of a parody is both commercial and expressive, thus
requiring the court to evaluate whether the parody is more commercial
or more expressive."
158. Id. In support of this decision, the court noted:
This pivotal trademark issue [whether there is likelihood of confusion] is
particularly amenable to resolution by a jury for two reasons. First, the jury,
which represents a cross-section of consumers, is well-suited to evaluate [sic]
whether an "ordinary consumer" would likely be confused. Second, the likeli-
hood of consumer confusion is an "inherently factual" issue that depends on
the unique facts and circumstances of each case.
Id. at 318. Furthermore, the court indicated that it did not want to stray from the
statutory test of likelihood of confusion, stating that "[slimilarity of format and intent
to profit . .. are not precise equivalents of the dispositive statutory language." Id. at
322.
159. Id.
160. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992)
(arguing that the First Amendment does not afford much protection to commercial
speech, including parodies used for commercial purposes), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2443 (1993); Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that parodies are protected when the interest in
expression outweighs the risk of consumer confusion); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Pub-
lishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir.) (holding that the First Amendment can protect
parodies where they are expressive speech), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987); Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that trademark rights do not necessarily have to yield to First Amendment
rights).
161. Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 895 (1988) (discussing the
varying degrees of constitutional protection given to speech).
162. The Ninth Circuit court struggled with this issue in White, 971 F.2d 1395. In
White, the defendants created an advertisement for their VCRs that parodied Vanna
White, a celebrity hostess on the game show "Wheel of Fortune." The advertisement,
featuring a robot dressed as White, was supposed to portray a fictitious ad for Wheel
of Fortune in the year 2012. Id. at 1396. The court concluded that the advertisement
was more commercial than expressive and* refused to protect the ad as a legitimate
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 0 the
defendant used a uniform in the film "Debbie Does Dallas" markedly
similar to a Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders uniform. The court denied the
defendant's film protection under the First Amendment." The court
stated that the "[pilaintiff's trademark is in the nature of a property
right,.., and as such it need not 'yield to the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of
communication exist."'0
In contrast, the First Circuit gave First Amendment protection to a
trademark parody in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc." The
court criticized the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders decision, arguing that
"trademark is not property in the ordinary sense but only a word or sym-
bol indicating the origin of a commercial product."'67 Thus, the court
use under trademark law. Id. at 1401. "In the case of commercial advertising . . . the
first amendment hurdle is not so high .... Realizing this, Samsung attempts to
elevate its ad above the status of garden-variety commercial speech by pointing to
the ad's parody of Vanna White. Samsung's argument is unavailing." Id. at 1401 n.3
(citations omitted).
163. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
164. Id. at 206. The court held that the injunction issued against the film was not
an unconstitutional "prior restraint," rather it was a protection of a private party's
property rights. Id. The court reasoned that the Lanham Act is "content neutral," and
therefore, the concerns associated with "prior restraint" would not apply. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972)). Lloyd Corp.
involved real property rights. The Supreme Court held that the owner of a shopping
center had no obligation to allow others access to the property for purposes of
exercising their First Amendment rights. Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 570. The Court
stated that property rights need not defer to First Amendment protections where
sufficient alternative means for expression exist. Id. at 567. The Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders case involved intellectual property rights, and the court analogized their
rights to the real property rights in Lloyd Corp. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604
F.2d at 206. The court concluded that there were numerous ways in which the film-
makers could comment on "sexuality in athletics" without infringing on the
Cheerleaders' trademark rights. Id.
166. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987).
167. Id. at 29 (quoting Power Test Petroleum Distribs., Inc. v. Calco Gas, 754 F.2d
91, 97 (2d Cir. 1985)). The L.L. Bean court argued that the Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders court had not "fully assessed the nature of a trademark owner's property
rights." Id. The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders court relied on loyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972), and analogized intellectual property rights to real property rights.
Id.; see supra note 160. The L.L. Bean court did not accept this analogy between
intellectual property rights and real property rights. Id. Instead, the court expounded
upon the distinctive characteristics of trademark rights, relying on Lucasfilm Ltd. v.
High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931 (D.D.C. 1985):
In that case, the owners of the trademark "Star Wars" alleged injury from
public interest groups that used the term in commercial advertisements pre-
senting their views on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. Judge
Gesell stressed that the sweep of a trademark owner's rights extends only to
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concluded that the First Amendment issue cannot be readily dis-
missed." The court noted that although trademark law does place limi-
tations on First Amendment rights, these limitations are not all constitu-
tionally permissible regulations of commercial speech." 9 The L.L. Bean
court held that a parody could be protected as expression where. the use
of the trademark was "editorial or artistic."' 70
injurious, unauthorized commercial uses of the mark by another .... Trade-
mark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the
mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view.
L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 29 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court believed that
limitations on the non-commercial uses of a trademark could lead to undesirable re-
sults. For example, "a corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the
use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct." Id. at 33. Such a result would
be in conflict with the aim of the First Amendment: to promote the free flow of ideas.
See Tribe, supra note 161, at 785-86.
168. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 29.
169. "[A] parody which engenders consumer confusion would be entitled to less
protection than is granted by our decision today .... A parody which causes confu-
sion in the marketplace implicates the legitimate commercial and consumer protection
objectives of trademark law." Id. at 32 n.3 (citations omitted). "We think the Consti-
tution tolerates an incidental impact on rights of expression of commercial actors in
order to prevent a defendant from unauthorizedly merchandizing his products with
another's trademark." Id. at 32.
170. Id. at 33. This case exemplifies the difficulty in distinguishing "commercial"
from "artistic" or "expressive." Although the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark in
L.L. Bean is arguably commercial and in many ways similar to the use in Dallas,
there is enough of a distinction to justify the result. In L.L. Bean, the defendant,
Drake, published an erotic adult magazine. Id. at 27. One issue featured an article
entitled "LL Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog" which used LL. Bean's trademark,
but was labelled as "humor" and "parody." Id. The court held that this use was non-
commercial and categorized it as an "editorial or artistic parody." Id. at 32. The paro-
dy in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, however, did not have the same clear labelling
or editorial nature and was thus characterized by the court as a commercial use. Id.
at 31.
In both Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders and L.L. Bean, a well-known mark as part
of an artistic work was intended as a parody. The movie in Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders and the magazine in L.L. Bean were both placed in the stream of commerce
for profit. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 77-78; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d 200.
Interestingly, in both Dallas and L.L. Bean, the plaintiff alleged that its reputation
was damaged by the use of its trademark in a sexually explicit context.
The result in Dallas is understandable. The movie's status as a legitimate parody
is questionable, and the movie used "blatantly false and explicitly misleading adver-
tisements." Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 886 F.2d
490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989). The fact that the article in L.L. Bean was clearly labelled a
parody helps to distinguish it from Dallas. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 27. Even though
Drake used a facsimile of L.L. Bean's trademark, there was no question that the
The Second Circuit expanded the First Amendment analysis in Cliffs
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group. 7 ' The court
accepted the proposition that parody is a form of expression protected
by the First Amendment and recognized the legitimate yet conflicting
interest in preventing consumer deception.'" The court advocated a bal-
ancing test which would "weigh the public interest in free expression
against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion."'73 The court
held that parodies, due to their expressive nature, are afforded more
protection under the First Amendment than ordinary commercial prod-
ucts.' 4 The test for trademark infringement, whether there is a likeli-
hood of confusion, is satisfied if the risk of confusing the consumer out-
weighs the public interest in expression.7 The court will ultimately de-
termine whether there is a likelihood of confusion, but the public policy
favoring parodies allows a greater degree of confusion than that toler-
ated with non-artistic expression.'76 Applying this balancing test, the
court held that the interest in expression was not outweighed by the
likelihood of confusion and protected the defendant's parody.'"
article was merely a parody. The article did not purport to be an actual catalog
either issued or endorsed by L.L. Bean. Id. at 32. The movie in Dallas, however,
could be mistaken as a representation, accurate or not, of the Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 207. See also Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters.,
799 F. Supp. 894, 898-99 (N.D. Il1. 1992) (finding likelihood of confusion where there
was not clear notice that the products were parodies); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 611, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (requiring written
and oral notice that the film "The Greatest American Hero"'is not created by, spon-
sored by, or connected with the creators, producers, or distributors of "Superman,"
even though the likelihood of confusion is minimal).
171. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
172. Id. at 493-94.
173. Id. at 494. The court noted that "trademark protection is not lost simply be-
cause the allegedly infringing use is in connection with a work of artistic expression."
Id. at 493 (quoting Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 907 (1989)). The expressive use may still lead to confusion among consumers, in
which case, the trademark deserves protection. Id.
174. Id. at 495. The court also reasoned that parodies deserve "substantial freedom"
because they serve as both entertainment and a form of comment or criticism. Id. at
493.
175. Id. at 495.
176. Id.
177. The plaintiff, Cliff Notes, marketed condensed versions of classic literature as
academic study guides. Id. at 491. The defendant published Spy Notes, a satire of
Cliff Notes, containing condensed versions of contemporary urban novels. Id. at 491-
92. Although Spy Notes copied the academic style and yellow and black cover of
Cliff Notes, Spy Notes distinguished themselves by printing "A Satire" five times on
the cover in bright red lettering. Id. at 492. Additionally, Spy Notes featured other
writing on the cover and was priced ,more than twice as much as Cliff Notes. Id.
The court held that there was no likelihood of confusion because a reasonable pur-
chaser would realize that Spy Notes was a parody of Cliff Notes. Id. at 495.
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Whether courts grant protection for commercial use of a parody may
also depend upon ihe practical effects of the parody in the market-
place.'78 This approach to determine whether there is a likelihood of
confusion was defined in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates.'" In
Air Pirates, the defendants produced a counter-culture magazine entitled
"Air Pirates Funnies," which included a parody of Disney's cartoons.'"
The district court granted summary judgment to Disney because in "a
simple, visual, side-by-side comparison," the marks were so similar that
there was a likelihood of confusion.'"' The Ninth Circuit reversed,
deeming the district court's method of comparison insufficient.'" A sim-
ple side-by-side comparison, removed from the realities of the market,
cannot reveal whether the allegedly infringing mark could be confus-
ing.'" The court maintained that the marks should be compared as they
would be by a consumer in the marketplace."u The court held that in
178. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that there was a likelihood of confusion upon a showing of "competitive
proximity" between the plaintiffs and the defendant's products); Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding no likelihood of
confusion because a consumer would not confuse the story of "King Kong" with that
of "Donkey Kong"); Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir.
1981) (finding no likelihood of confusion where the products were unrelated); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that the court
must consider what actually occurs in the marketplace, and not merely perform a
side-by-side comparison of the marks); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enter., 799 F. Supp.
894, 897 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding a likelihood of confusion where the marks were
visually similar and used on similar products in the marketplace); Eveready Battery
Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 450 (N.D. IMI. 1991) (finding no trademark
infringement because the consumer would not confuse the Energizer Bunny with the
actor Leslie Nielsen dressed as a bunny); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Casey &
Casey, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 201, 204 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (holding that there is no likelihood
of confusion where a T-shirt with a "Miami Mice" caption parodied a television series
called "Miami Vice" because a consumer would not confuse human characters with
mice characters).
179. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
180. Id. at 752-53. The trademark infringement issue arose because the plaintiff
alleged that its "Silly Symphony" mark was copied. The only difference was that the





While a comparison of the mark and the imitation is one . . . factor, that
comparison should not be a simple, visual, side-by-side comparison but rather
the mark and the imitation should be viewed "in light of what occurs in the
this case the likelihood of confusion was "markedly diminished" because
the parody appeared within a comic book together with other cartoons
(as opposed to constituting a comic book in its entirety) and was sold
only in adult counter-culture stores, where the purchaser was likely to
recognize the "incompatibility of defendants' work with Disney's."'"
The likelihood of confusion will increase, however, if the defendant's
products can be substituted for the plaintiffs products.'" In Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak,'87 the court found an increased likeli-
hood of confusion due in part to the "competitive proximity" of the
plaintiffs and defendant's products.'" Mutual, an insurance company,
used an "Indian head" logo and the designation "Mutual of Omaha" as its
trademark.'" These marks were used on such items as T-shirts and cof-
fee mugs." Novak, an entrepreneur, created and sold a line of prod-
ucts, including T-shirts and coffee mugs, featuring a design with an ema-
ciated Indian head and the words "Mutant of Omaha."'' Despite an ab-
marketplace,".., taking into account the "circumstances surrounding the
purchase of the goods."
Id. (citations omitted).
185. Id. But see Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
In Nike, the court found a significant likelihood of confusion where the marks used
were visually similar and were used on identical goods in the marketplace. Id. at
897.
A comparison of plaintiffs and defendant's marks reveals that they are vir-
tually identical. In fact, the only difference between the marks is that [the
defendant] has substituted an "M" for the "N," thus using the word "MIKE"
rather than "NIKE." Even [the defendant] himself admitted . . . that from a
distance, the two marks could not be distinguished .... Moreover, both par-
ties sell T-shirts and sweatshirts.
Id.
186. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that there is likelihood of confusion because the defendant's products could
be substituted for the plaintiffs products), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988); Nike,
799 F. Supp. at .899 (holding that a likelihood of confusion existed because the
"MIKE" products served as a substitute for "NIKE" products).
187. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
188. Id. at 399 (citing SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co. 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980)
(recognizing competitive proximity as a factor to consider in determining the likeli-
hood of confusion)). However, there may still be trademark infringement where the
plaintiffs and defendant's products are not in direct, competition with each other.
Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1322, 1324 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that a $10 bottle of popcorn kernels labeled "Dom Popignon" might
constitute an infringement of "Dom Perignon" champagne). But see American Express
Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., No. 87 Civ. 8840, 1989 WL 39679 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that a condom package in the image of an American Express card was not
a trademark infringement).
189. Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 398.
190. Id. at 399.
191. Id. at 398. The design on the T-shirts also included the phrase "Nuclear Holo-
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sence of direct competition in the marketplace, the court held that a
likelihood of confusion existed because the consumer would find similar
marks on similar items."
Proof of actual confusion among consumers is related to an analysis of
the parody's effects in the marketplace." Although proof of actual confu-
sion is not required to prevail on an infringement claim,"u the lack of
actual confusion can bolster a defendant's argument against the likeli-
hood of confusion."l On the other hand, when proof of actual confu-
sion exists, the plaintiff will certainly prevail."
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Commercial Parodies in Copyright Law:
How to Rebut The Presumption of Unfairness
Sony established the proposition that commercial use of a copyrighted
work is presumptively unfair.'97 Thus, a defendant who parodies a copy-
righted work must rebut that presumption in order to receive fair use
protection." As shown above, the courts have not developed a consis-
tent standard for determining when a commercial parody will be protect-
ed." A consistent standard should be applied so that aspiring parodists
will know what is a permissible parody.2" Courts should consider only
caust Insurance." Id.
192. Id. at 399. See also Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894, 899
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding likelihood of confusion where defendant's products could be
substituted for Nike's products).
193. Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 399.
194. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
195. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating
that the lack of proof of actual confusion diminishes the likelihood of confusion),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
196. See Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 400 (finding for the plaintiff where a survey
showed evidence of actual confusion); DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Busi-
ness, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 116-17 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (granting summary judgment to*
plaintiff where undisputed evidence of actual confusion was presented).
197. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
198. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir.
1992) (stating that the commercial use of the work weighed against a finding of fair
use, because the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of unfairness).
199. See supra notes 80, 92, 93, 95, 108, and accompanying text.
200. Currently, cases are decided inconsistently. Compare Tin Pan Apple Inc. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a television
commercial that parodied a rap group was not a fair use because of the commercial
one element in determining whether the defendant has rebutted the pre-
sumption of unfairness: the degree of the parody's expressive or critical
value.
Courts should not deny protection to commercial parodies altogeth-
er."0 Parodies, whether commercial or not, provide valuable social com-
mentary and criticism,' and to deny protection to parodies on the ba-
sis of their commercial nature would deter creative efforts and deprive
public benefits.' Thus, courts should protect qualified commercial par-
odies as a fair use.
To determine whether a parody qualifies as a fair use, courts should
consider all four statutory factors.2" They should interpret the presump-
tion of unfairness as a presumption that the first factor weighs against a
finding of fair use unless the defendant rebuts it."° The courts have
struggled with the question of how one can rebut the presumption and
have taken many different approaches.'
use) with Eveready Battery Co., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 446
(N.D. Il. 1991) (holding that a television commercial that parodied another television
commercial was a fair use, despite the commercial use); compare Fisher v. Dees, 794
F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the song "When Sonny Sniffs Glue," which
parodied "When Sunny Gets Blue," was a fair use) with MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the song "Cunnilingus Champion of Compa-
ny C," which parodied "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy," was not a fair use).
Congress permits the fair use doctrine to be applied on a case-by-case basis
because "the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can
rise . . .precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute." H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). However, Congress also ac-
knowledges that there are guidelines to be used in determining whether there is a
fair use, namely the four factors in § 107. Id. Congress stated that the statutory
factors "provide some gauge for balancing the equities." Id. By applying a single,
consistent standard to rebut the presumption of unfairness, the courts would not be
forming "exact rules," but rather clarifying the guidelines.
201. Shaked, supra note 10, at 7.
202. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that even commer-
cial parodies should be protected because of their important role in social and liter-
ary criticism).
203. Shaked, supra note 10 at 5.
204. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Id.
205. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
206. One approach is to consider the effect on the economic value of the original.
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The approach employed by the court in Fisher is inappropriate. 7
The court stated that the defendant could rebut the presumption of un-
fairness by showing that the parody did not diminish the economic value
of the original.' However, the fourth statutory factor already accounts
for this.2" The first factor should be considered in isolation and not
merged with the fourth factor."' Congress provided the courts with
four factors for consideration in a fair use analysis, and it will dilute the
strength of the multi-factored analysis if courts blend the factors.'
The courts should not consider the intent of the defendant in deter-
mining whether the parody qualifies as a fair use.212 The purpose of the
fair use doctrine is to balance economic interests of the copyright holder
with the benefit to the public from legitimate commentary."3 A copy-
right holder should not lose his rights merely because the defendant did
not intend to infringe on them.2" Likewise, a court should not deny pro-
tection to a parody that qualifies as a fair use even when the parodist
See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text. A second approach is to ask whether
the defendant will profit financially from the parody. See supra notes 96-110 and
accompanying text. A final approach is to look at the intent of the defendant. See
supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
207. In Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986), the court examined the eco-
nomic effect on the original. Id. at 438.
208. Id. This was probably the approach that the Sony Court intended. The Court
directed its attention to the fourth factor in determining whether the defendant's use
was fair- "[Clongress has also directed us to consider 'the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.' The purpose of copyright is
to create incentives for creative effort." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).
209. The fourth fair use factor considers "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or the value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
210. Congress listed the factors separately, indicating that they are distinct. The his-
torical notes for § 107 state that the specific wording of the section is due to the
collective efforts of courts to resolve the conflicts that have arisen under the fair use
doctrine. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1982).
211. See Shaked, supra note 10 at 7 (arguing that a narrow application of the fair
use doctrine would inhibit criticism and comment).
212. The court examined the intent of the defendant in Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d
301 (2d Cir. 1992). In Koons, the court was pre-disposed to find that the defendant's
work was not a fair use because he acted with "bad faith" in copying the plaintiffs
work. Id. at 310.
213. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1434-35 (6th Cir. 1992)
.(explaining that the fair use doctrine allows for comment or criticism where the
copyright owner would otherwise have a monopoly interest).
214. Id. at 1436 (stating that not all works intended as parodies will be fair uses).
had a profit motive.2"' The intent of the defendant is irrelevant.
A defendant should rebut the presumption of unfairness by showing
that the parody has a high degree of critical or commentary value."' In
creating the fair use doctrine, Congress intended to protect various forms
of expression. 7 Originally, the first factor considered "the purpose and
character of the use," including whether the use was for the purpose of
criticism or comment. Only later did Congress amend that factor to con-
sider whether the use was commercial or non-profit.2"' The analysis of
each factor should be self-contained.219 Thus, in order to offset the com-
mercial character of a use, the court should examine the expressive char-
acter of the use rather than shift focus to the fourth statutory factor."0
Some of the parody cases have addressed the issue of the commentary
value needed to successfully utilize the parody defense."' In both
215. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) (protecting a parody,
even though the defendant made a profit).
216. The public will benefit from parodies with great expressive value. Betamax,
supra note 2 at 1401 (explaining that courts did not want to limit expressive paro-
dies because of their socially valuable use). On the other hand, the public has little
interest in parodies that are for commercial gain only. See Tribe, supra note 161 at
895 (discussing why commercial speech receives less protection than expressive
speech). Thus, if the parody is only for commercial gain, the defendant should not be
able to rebut the presumption of unfairness; but where the parody has expressive
value, the presumption should be considered rebutted so that the public may benefit
from the parodist's creativity.
"While commercial motivation and fair use can exist side by side, the court may
consider whether the alleged infringing use was primarily for public benefit or for
private commercial gain." New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc.,
693 F. Supp. 1517, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182
(2d Cir. 1981)).
217. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982).
218. Id. Furthermore, Congress noted that the commercial nature of the use should
be "weighed along with the other factors in fair use decisions." Id. (emphasis added).
Congress intended that the courts consider the commercial nature of the use as part
of the first factor (the character of the use). Id.
219. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
220. In Fisher v. Dees, the court concluded that the presumption of unfairness was
rebutted because the parody did not adversely affect the economic value of the orig-
inal. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438, 440 (9th Cir. 1986). To rebut the presumption
of unfairness, the court could have looked at the expressive nature of the song and
considered the fourth factor (the economic effect on the original) individually. The
court acknowledged that the parody was a commentary. Id. at 437 (citing Pillsbury
Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131 (N.D. Ga 1981)). Thus, the court
could have weighed the expressive nature of the parody against the commercial
nature of the parody to determine whether the first factor would favor protecting the
parody. Meanwhile, the fourth factor would still be in the defendant's favor. By
keeping the first and fourth factors distinct, the court will be better able to objective-
ly analyze whether the use is fair.
221. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436 n.8 (6th Cir. 1992)
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Koons and Acuff-Rose, the courts denied fair use protection to a parody
and noted that the parody did not have sufficient commentary value.'
The parodies criticized society as a whole, but they did not comment on
the copyrighted work itself.' The courts found that comment on the
original work was a necessary element of the parody defense. 4 Thus, if
sufficient commentary value is a necessary element of a parody, then the
fair use analysis should reflect that requirement."
Furthermore, if defendants could rebut the presumption of unfairness
by showing significant commentary value, the courts would further the
goal of copyright laws." Thus, in order to apply a standard that is con-
sistent with the principles of copyright law, courts should require the
defendant to rebut the presumption of unfairness by showing sufficient
commentary value.
B. Commercial Parodies in Trademark Law:
True Parodies Will Not Engender Confusion
As demonstrated by the treatment of parodies in trademark infringe-
ment cases, commercialism is an important factor. Moreover, courts have
dealt with this factor in an inconsistent manner."7 However, commer-
(arguing that a parody should have commentary value to be a fair use), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir.) (holding that
comment on the original is a necessary element of the parody defense) cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
222. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436 n.8.; Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
223. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436 n.8; Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
224. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436 n.8; Koons, 960 F.2d at 310. See also supra notes
91, 111.
225. The historical notes also mention the commentary value of a parody. H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). When
Congress notes that a parody can be a form of fair use, it permits the use of the
copyrighted material when the parody comments on that work. Id. If Congress in-
tended for parody to be permitted as a fair use when it comments on the copyright-
ed work, then the fair use analysis should reflect that concern.
226. The goal of copyright law is to promote creativity. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text. The economic benefit to the copyright holder is merely incidental.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text. By offsetting the commercial use of a
parody with a showing of expressive value, the courts will account for both the
copyright holder's economic interest and the primary goal of furthering expression.
227. Some courts deny protection to a parody altogether if the parody has a com-
mercial use. See supra note 125. The courts that do protect commercial parodies use
different analytical approaches. Some courts focus on the intent of the defendant. See
supra note 142. Other courts apply a First Amendment analysis. See supra note 160.
cial parodies need not present special problems in determining whether
there is infringement. The only test for trademark infringement is wheth-
er there is a likelihood of confusion.' The courts need only strictly con-
strue this test.m
A true parody will not present an infringement problem. It will distin-
guish itself from the mark that it is parodying and will not confuse the
consumer as to the source or sponsorship of the parody.' ° If a parody
does not successfully distinguish itself from the original mark, then the
prevention of consumer confusion, the policy underlying the trademark
laws, should outweigh the defendant's limited interest in expression."
Finally, some courts focus on the practical effects of the parody in the marketplace.
See supra note 178.
228. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
229. The courts need not look to parody as a separate defense.
In a traditional trademark infringement suit founded on the likelihood of
confusion rationale, the claim of parody is not really a separate "defense" as
such, but merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that customers
are not likely to be confused as to source, sponsorship or approval.
McCarthy, supra note 32, at § 31:38.
230. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir.)
(holding that the T-shirt parody of Budweiser beer was not confusing because the
words on the shirt were sufficiently distinguishable), cert. denied, 113 U.S. 206
(1992); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 492 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that "Spy Notes" distinguished itself from "Cliffs
Notes" by printing "A Satire" over the front cover five times in red lettering);
Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that the mark "Lardashe" would not be confused with the mark "Jordache");
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
consumer would not confuse the drug-ingesting parody of Disney characters with the
actual Disney characters), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Girl Scouts of the
United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(holding that a poster of a pregnant Girl Scout is sufficiently so distinct that a con-
sumer would not think that it was sponsored by the Girl Scouts of America).
231. Since the Constitution accords less First Amendment protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally safe-guarded forms of expression, a commercial
parody will not receive substantial protection simply because of its inherently com-
mercial aspects. Tribe, supra note 161 at 896 n.41. The trademark laws are a legiti-
mate regulation of commercial speech with the purpose of protecting the consumer
from confusion. See e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 n.3
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pus-
sycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979).
Trademark laws have properly superseded the defendant's interest in expression.
See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894, 899 (N.D. IlM. 1992) (refusing
to protect defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark because the parody was not readily
apparent and created a great risk of consumer confusion); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206 (refusing to protect defendant's use of plaintiffs uni-
forms because the use did not qualify as a parody and created a great risk of con-
sumer confusion).
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The courts, however, should not disallow all commercial parodies.
Since a parody may have expressive or commentary value, an outright
prohibition of trademark parodies would deprive the public of this social-
ly valuable use.'
The current methods, however, by which the courts have analyzed
parodies are inadequate and lead to inconsistencies. The courts should
not consider the intent of the defendant because it has no bearing on the
issue of consumer confusion.' The First Amendment analysis applied
by some courts often may be too difficult to apply effectively; it is almost
impossible to distinguish between commercial speech and expressive
speech in parody cases, especially because commercial parodies tend to
contain both commercial and expressive aspects.' Furthermore, strict
adherence to the likelihood of confusion test obviates the need to pro-
tect expression by other means.' If the parody is not confusing, then
the court will protect it, but if the parody is confusing, then the court
would deny protection as a legitimate regulation of commercial
speech.'
Courts should follow the holding of Air Pirates and look to the practi-
cal effects of the parody in the marketplace. 7 A court displays a lack
of understanding when it attempts to determine whether consumers are
confused without looking at the market. A market and its consumers are
232. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32-33; Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495.
233. The court examined the intent of the defendant in Jordache and concluded
that there was no likelihood of confusion because the defendant intended merely to
parody and not to confuse the public. Jordache Enters., 828 F.2d at 1486. The court
instead should have objectively examined only whether there was a likelihood of con-
fusion in the marketplace. The test for trademark infringement is whether there is a
likelihood of confusion. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988). Intent to confuse is only one of many
factors to be considered in determining the likelihood of confusion. Id. Of course, the
result probably would have been the same.
234. See supra notes 162, 170 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Girl Scouts of the United States v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304
F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text. In Girl
Scouts, the court strictly construed the likelihood of confusion test and protected the
parody, finding that it sufficiently distinguished itself. Id. at 1231. Hence, there was
no need to use a First Amendment analysis.
236. See supra note 232.
237. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing that the court must not merely perform a visual side-by-side comparison of the
marks but should also consider "the marks in light of what occurs in the market-
place"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
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intricately tied and profoundly affect each other.' The court in Air Pi-
rates correctly examined the effects in the market to determine the like-
lihood of confusion.' Furthermore, when examining cases on appeal,
courts should bear in mind that juries, as a group of consumers, are best
suited to determine the likelihood of confusion and the court should be
hesitant to upset the jury's verdict." °
In determining whether a commercial parody constitutes a trademark
infringement, the court should strictly adhere to the likelihood of confu-
sion test because it will further the purposes of the trademark laws and
provide a consistent standard of analysis. A true parody will be protected
by the trademark laws because it will, by its nature, distinguish itself
from the original such that there will be no likelihood of confusion."'
V. CONCLUSION
The court's treatment of commercial parodies in copyright and trade-
mark infringement cases has been inconsistent and erratic." Courts
need to apply a uniform standard that reflects the policy considerations
of the copyright and trademark laws.
When analyzing commercial parodies in copyright infringement cases,
the courts must determine whether the defendant has rebutted the pre-
sumption of unfairness.' The courts should consider one factor: the
expressive value of the parody. This factor alone instructs the courts to
adhere to the purpose of copyright law and address an issue that they
consider to be important.'
In analyzing commercial parodies under trademark law, the courts
should not consider extraneous factors. They should strictly adhere to
the test for trademark infringement and ask only whether there is a like-
238. EDGAR K BROWNING & JACQUELENE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 7 (1989).
239. See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 158.
241. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 83, 94, 95, 97, 107, 108, 125, 141, 160, 178, 200, 230 and
accompanying text.
243. There is a presumption that every commercial use of a copyrighted work is an
unfair exploitation of a copyright holder's interest. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451, reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984).
This presumption must be rebutted in order for a defendant to prevail. See, e.g.,
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that
the commercial use of the work weighed against a finding of fair use, and thus, the
defendant did not meet the burden of rebutting the presumption of unfairness), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993).
244. See supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
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lihood of confusion.245 Courts may examine the practical effects of the
parody in the marketplace because the likelihood of confusion will de-
pend on how the consumers perceive the allegedly infringing product. 6
However, courts should not stray from the initial inquiry of whether the
parody engenders confusion. A true parody does not engender confusion
because it is so distinguishable from the original that there is no confu-
sion as to source or sponsorship.247
The courts should not refuse to protect parodies merely because of
their commercial use. A parody may provide expressive or commentary
value or it may merely entertain. The public benefits from the creativity
of the parodist, and absent a legitimate public policy concern under
copyright or trademark law, courts should not hinder such creative ef-
forts.
TAMMI A. GAUTHIER
245. See supra notes 228-41 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.

